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Abstract
Despite the evidence on incomplete financial markets and substantial risk being
borne by innovators, current models of growth through creative destruction
predominantly model innovators’ as risk neutral. Risk aversion is expected
to reduce the incentive to innovate and we might fear that without insurance
innovation completely disappears in the long run. The present paper introduces
risk averse agents into an occupational choice model of endogenous growth in
which insurance against failure to innovate is not available. We derive a clear
negative relationship between the level of risk aversion and long run growth.
Surprisingly, we show that in an equilibrium there exists a cut-off value of risk
aversion below which the growth rate of the mass of innovators tends to a
strictly positive constant. In this case, innovation persists on the long run and
consumption per capita grows at a strictly positive rate. On the other hand, for
levels of risk aversion above the cut-off value, the economy eventually stagnates.
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1. Introduction
The outcome of the individual process of innovation is inevitably uncertain,
and modern models of growth through creative destruction allow for such un-
certainty. However, despite the fact there is wide evidence that agents are risk
averse, these models assume that investment in R&D is not associated to any
risk2. Common arguments for this simplification are that the risk inherent in
performing R&D can either be perfectly hedged against, or that R&D is per-
formed by risk neutral firms. In fact, perfect insurance against R&D risk is
theoretically unlikely, due to problems of asymmetric information between in-
novators and investors, and/or problems of moral hazard (Akerlof (1970), Arrow
(1962)). Empirically, a funding gap for R&D has been well-documented even
for developed economies, especially for small and new firms (for recent surveys,
see Hall (2002) or Hall and Lerner (2010)3), and capital markets appear to be
imperfect, see, e.g., Card et al. (2007)4.
The rate of technological progress and consequently the growth rate of con-
sumption per capita crucially depend on the resources devoted to innovation.
Without perfect capital markets to finance R&D, the level of risk aversion of
agents is likely to impact on the allocation of resources and on the economy’s
long-run growth rate. The aim of the present paper is to analyze the extent of
this impact.
Our model is based on Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Kortum (1997). Agents
are born with an endowment of labor that they supply inelastically at birth. The
2See, e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991b), Kortum (1997),
Segerstrom (1998) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) for a non-exhaustive list.
3Further examples include Evans and Jovanovic (1989) who find evidence that wealth is
positively linked to the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur, and Caggese (2012), who em-
pirically estimates that increased uncertainty has a large negative effect on risky investments
by entrepreneurial firms.
4Incidentally, in neoclassical growth models, effects of imperfect insurance of income risk
on growth have been analyzed quite extensively. See, e.g., Aiyagari (1994), Angeletos (2007),
and the references therein. Generally, the literature has shown that while labor income risk
increases precautionary savings, capital income risk can have an ambiguous effect on savings.
In Aghion et al. (2010), tighter credit lowers mean growth through its effect on the cyclical
composition of investment.
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length of an agent’s life is uncertain. Following Yaari (1965) and Blanchard
(1985), each agent faces a constant Poisson death rate. A fraction of the labor
endowment is specific and can only be supplied to the production of output.
Agents face a discrete occupational choice about the supply of their remaining
labor: They can either work in the production sector, or become researchers.
While the wage in the production sector is certain, the returns of a researcher
are uncertain, and in particular, an unsuccessful researcher does not earn any
return. Successful researchers are compensated with the expected present value
of their innovation5. Agents can smooth their consumption through saving, but
as their entire income occurs at the beginning of their lives, they are unable to
borrow. The assumption of a single income simplifies the analysis considerably,
and allows us to abstract from wealth effects in the occupational choice decision.
The lack of insurance with respect to research success allows us to derive
a clear and stark relationship between risk aversion and growth. We derive a
cut-off value of risk aversion above which the economy stagnates. Consequently,
there exists an upper bound on the stock of research and on average consumption
per capita. These bounds are decreasing in the level of risk aversion. However,
at or below this cut-off value, stagnation is not an equilibrium. On an asymp-
totically balanced growth path, both average consumption per capita and the
level of technology grow without bounds. For levels of risk aversion strictly
below the cut-off, on an asymptotically balanced growth path the measure of
researchers will grow at a positive rate in the long run. This rate is increasing
in the rate of population growth, though strictly below it, and decreasing in the
level of risk aversion. To summarize, while risk aversion does indeed depress the
growth rate of the economy compared to a risk neutral setting, even without
any form of insurance complete stagnation of the economy does not necessarily
5An important aspect in the innovation and patent literature is the question of appropri-
ability of innovations. In our model, a successful innovator can perfectly reap the benefits of
his innovation.
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occur.
The cut-off value we derive corresponds to a coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion of unity. Empirically, the value of the coefficient of risk aversion (which in
our model is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution) is still
debated. Many authors such as Campbell (1999), Kocherlakota (1996), Pat-
terson and Pesaran (1992), Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio (2003), Alan and
Browning (2010) or Alan et al. (2009) estimate coefficients of risk aversion well
above unity, or equivalently, elasticities of substitutions below unity. See also
Attanasio and Weber (2010) for a recent survey. On the other hand, Mulligan
(2002) or Gruber (2006) estimate elasticities of substitution above unity, while
the results of Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Yogo (2004) are inconclusive.
While our model remains agnostic about the empirical value of risk aversion, it
does stress that the qualitative behavior of the economy in the long run critically
depends on it.
Our model belongs to the endogenous growth literature6, and it is not our
aim to provide a comprehensive review of this literature here. Within this
literature, it is most closely related to recent contributions by Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa
and Wen (2008) and Zeira (2011), both of which model risk averse agents in
occupational choice models7. Zeira (2011) models the endogenous formation of
patent races for innovations of different levels of difficulty. In an extension, he
introduces a model with finitely-lived agents and logarithmic utility in which
some form of insurance is granted to innovators by assuming that they always
work a fraction of their time in the production sector. He shows that risk
aversion can lead to over-researching of “easy” innovations, as these are less
6Such as Romer (1986), Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992),Grossman and Helpman
(1991b), Segerstrom (1998), Jones (1995), Jones (2005), Kremer (1993), or Alcala´ and Ciccone
(2004), for a non-exhaustive list. Some very good overviews of the main theories of endogenous
growth can be found in, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003), Grossman and Helpman (1991a),
Aghion and Howitt (1998) and more recently Acemoglu (2009).
7Also related, though not dealing with risk aversion as such, are Cozzi and Giordani (2011),
who study ambiguity aversion of innovators and find that higher ambiguity aversion leads to
lower R&D efforts.
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risky, where riskiness is defined not over innovative success, but over winning
the patent race. As such, both the environment and the question studied differ
substantially from our paper. While Zeira focuses on the allocation of resources
into different types of innovation, we study the choice between a production and
a research sector. Foremost, however, the main contribution of our paper lies
in deriving the relationship between the level of risk aversion and its qualitative
effects on the economy (stagnation vs. growth). As in Zeira the level of risk
aversion is fixed to unity, such a relationship is not derived.
Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and Wen (2008) are the closest to our own model, as their
paper focuses on the effects of redistributive taxation on growth and inequality if
agents are risk averse. They show that through insurance effects, redistributive
taxes may indeed increase growth. This result is driven by the same intuition
underlying our own results; the redistributive tax acts as a social insurance for
unsuccessful innovators. The innovation process they model is built on Aghion
and Howitt (1992), i.e. in contrast to us, they consider fixed inventive steps,
a constant population, and the probability to innovate is independent of the
stock of ideas. This implies that their model shares the prediction of strong
scale effects of Aghion and Howitt (1992), and the growth rate of the economy
is an increasing function of the number of researchers. As such, any variable
that impacts the level of research, also impacts the growth rate of the economy.
Within our model, we can separate effects on levels from effects on growth rates.
Most importantly, Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and Wen (2008) focus on the importance
of redistribution on growth, while our focus is on the interplay between risk
aversion and the occurrence or lack of long-run growth. Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and
Wen (2008) exclusively consider values of risk aversion that are below the cut-off
value above which we find that the economy stagnates. We instead, are able to
show that the existence of long-run growth hinges critically on the value of risk
aversion.
Finally, our model is related, albeit less closely, to work on inequality in
wealth and occupational choice under imperfect capital markets, such as Baner-
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jee and Newman (1991), Banerjee and Newman (1993), and Galor and Zeira
(1993)8. While we share with this literature the assumption of imperfect capital
markets, conceptually we differ substantially. In the above literature, imperfect
capital markets affect outcomes because agents are ex ante heterogeneous in
wealth. In our model, agents are homogeneous in endowments and the lack of
capital markets affects the growth rate through a lack of insurance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the optimization problem of consumers in the economy, while section 3 details
the production side of the economy, including the innovation process and the
value of R&D. Our results on equilibrium growth rates are derived in section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Consumers
2.1. Endowments
The economy is populated by a mass Lt of agents, with a (gross) population
growth rate n ≥ 0. Following Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985), each agent
faces a Poisson death rate of υ ∈ (0,∞)9. Each agent is endowed with 1+o units
of labor, which he supplies inelastically at the instant he is born, τ . Out of his
labor endowment, o units are production-specific, and can only be supplied in
the production of consumption goods10. The agent chooses between supplying
his remaining one unit of labor in the production of consumption goods and
becoming a researcher11. Income in production is certain and the wage rate is
8See also Aghion and Bolton (1997), Ghatak and Jiang (2002), or Mookherjee and Ray
(2003) and the references therein.
9The introduction of a death rate is in itself innocuous. We do not wish to model infinitely
lived agents who make repeated work/research decision at each t, among other reasons as in
such a setup it is difficult to justify that agents would be incapable of borrowing against their
future (expected) income.
10This assumption implies that unsuccessful researchers have a minimum income out of
which they can consume.
11Units of labor are indivisible in our model.
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unity12. The pay-off from being a researcher is uncertain.
Successful researchers are those with an idea whose efficiency surpasses the
current state of the art; we denote such ideas as innovations. The probability
to innovate has two terms. First, it depends on the probability that an idea
arrives to the researcher, which is a Poisson Process with an exogenous arrival
rate of α. Second, on the probability that efficiency of the idea is above the
state of the art, which is determined endogenously in the model.
Successful researchers are compensated with the expected value of their in-
novation. This is increasing in the efficiency improvement that the innovation
represents, relative to the previous state of the art, and in the expected length
that the innovation itself will remain the state of the art13. Unsuccessful re-
searchers have zero income apart from the wage return of their o units of labor
they supply for production.
2.2. Preferences and budget sets
Agents are risk averse and aggregate the available goods in a Cobb-Douglas
fashion. They cannot borrow. This very strict borrowing constraint arises
naturally in the current setup in which expected future income of any agent
after his birth is zero. Agents in debt would never be able to repay their debts.
A less restrictive setup would equip agents with a unit flow of labor at each t.
However, allowing for the possibility of multiple innovations during a lifetime
would severely complicate the utility maximization problem, and distract from
our focus of the effect of risk aversion without insurance.14
12The increased efficiency in production through research will translate into lower prices
and increase the real wages of production workers.
13Our equilibrium properties are not affected if we assume instead that the compensation
paid to the innovator depends on the realized efficiency improvement of his innovation
14We would have to keep track of all past decisions of agents, as well as whether their past
research had been successful. See, e.g., Levhari and Srinivasan (1969), Merton (1969), or
Samuelson (1969). Note that the natural borrowing constraint of a finitely lived agent would
be zero also in this case, as the worst possible outcome would be for an agent to always be an
unsuccessful researcher.
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However, agents can save any unconsumed income to smooth consumption
over their (expected) lifetime. We assume that there exists a financial interme-
diary that acts as an economy-wide mutual fund, and that holds the ownership
claims of all firms that operate in the economy. This fund plays two roles. Its
first role is in re-allocating resources between agents and firms, and over time.
It enables agents to deposit their income, in return for interest payments, which
allows them to smooth their consumption over their expected lifetime. Upon
receiving their income in τ , each agent i deposits his income with the inter-
mediary. We denote deposits as Aiτ |τ . Deposited income pays an interest of
rt, which is the rate at which future profits of firms are discounted. Accruing
profits are used to pay interests on deposits and to satisfy withdrawals made
for consumption. In this way, the intermediary re-allocates the resources across
agents at each t, and the resource constraint of the economy implies that the
entire production is consumed each t. The second role of the fund is as an
intermediary between researchers and firms. Researchers who have found an
innovation can sell this to the fund for its present expected value, which gets
credited to their deposits with the fund. The intermediary then gives the right
to use the innovation in production to a firm. In this way, the only aspect in
which workers, successful researchers, and unsuccessful researchers differ, is in
their initial deposits, Aiτ |τ , with the fund.
Due to uncertain lifetimes, an agent typically will die while holding positive
deposits with the intermediary, and we assume that his deposits become prop-
erty of the intermediary on this occasion. Death occurs with probability υ at
t, independent of an agent’s current age. As this is the flow rate with which
the agent loses his assets, the intermediary will compensate him for this risk by
paying him a return of rt + υ on his deposits. Under these assumptions, the
expected utility of agent i born at time τ can be expressed as
Uiτ = Eτ
∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+υ)(t−τ)
[
exp
∫ 1
0
ln xit|τ (j)dj
]1−σ
− 1
1− σ dt
 (1)
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where xit|τ (j) is the quantity that agent i, born at τ , consumes of good j at time
t. ρ is the subjective discounting factor, which is assumed to be constant. Future
consumption is discounted both by this factor as well as υ as this gives the rate
at which future consumption is lost due to death. The level of risk aversion is
given by σ ≥ 0. The individual maximizes (1) with respect to {xit|τ (j)} subject
to the following constraints:
a˙it|τ = (rt + υ − P˙t
Pt
)ait|τ −Xit|τ , (2a)
ait|τ ≥ 0, Xit|τ ≥ 0, (2b)
lim
t→∞e
−(r¯tτ+υ− P˙P tτ )(t−τ)ait|τ = 0, (2c)
where
P˙
P tτ
≡ 1
t− τ
t∫
τ
P˙s
Ps
ds and
r¯tτ ≡ 1
t− τ
t∫
τ
rs ds
are the average growth rate of the price index and the average interest rate
between t and τ respectively. ait|τ is the amount of savings the agent has
deposited at t in real terms, i.e., ait|τ =
Ait|τ
Pt
, Pt is the aggregate price index in
the economy and Xit|τ is the consumption index of agent i. The initial deposits
that an agent has, Aiτ |τ , depends on his choice of occupation. We take the
wage to be the numeraire. Aiτ |τ then is equal to 1+o if he works in production,
equal to the expected value of the innovation (Vτ , which will be determined
later) plus o if he is a successful researcher, and o if he is an unsuccessful
researcher. If an idea arrives that surpasses the technological frontier, innovation
is immediate. Note that the uncertainty about the initial amount of deposits
is the only uncertainty that the agent faces. Once this is resolved, his lifetime
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utility becomes certain. The values of deposits and consumption at each t
depend on when an agent is born, and are therefore indexed by the cohort τ .
2.3. Individual and aggregate demand
The problem of maximizing (1) subject to the constraints in (2) is entirely
standard. Agents first decide how to allocate their income across their expected
lifetime and then, given the allocation of income, decide how to allocate expen-
diture across varieties of goods. Let the optimal price and consumption indices
be
Pt = exp
1∫
0
ln pt(j) dj (3)
and
Xit|τ = exp
1∫
0
ln xit|τ (j) dj. (4)
respectively.
Then the first order conditions yield the familiar Euler Equation
X˙it|τ
Xit|τ
=
1
σ
[
rt − ρ− P˙t
Pt
]
. (5)
and consumption at every t can be expressed as
Xit|τ =
ait|τ
µt
, (6)
where
µt =
∫ ∞
t
exp{[(1− 1/σ)
(
P˙
P st
− r¯st
)
− ρ/σ − υ](s− t)} ds. (7)
Note that in the case of σ = 1, µt simplifies considerably, to µt = 1ρ+υ .
All agents of cohort τ consume according to (6), regardless of their occupation.
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The only factor in which their consumption plans differ is the amount of initial
deposits, aiτ |τ .
Given equations (5) and (6), consumption at any point in time can be ex-
pressed as
Xit|τ =
aiτ |τ
µτ
· e 1σ (r¯tτ−ρ− P˙P tτ )(t−τ) (8)
3. Supply
3.1. Production and innovation
The production and innovation side of the economy is a closed economy
version of the model introduced by Eaton and Kortum (2001). Minor changes
with respect to this paper are our introduction of initial labor endowments o, the
fact that at each t only newly-born agents are active, and the introduction of an
initial technology level, T0. Here, we summarize the main results of Eaton and
Kortum (2001) for convenience under these adjustments. Detailed derivations
and proofs can be found in the original paper.
Time is continuous. The economy produces at each t a continuum of goods,
indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Labor is the only input in production. How many units
of good j can be produced with a unit input of labor depends on the highest
efficiency level in production, z(j), and differs across goods j. z(j) represents
the state of the art of production in sector j, and {z(j)|j ∈ [0, 1]} is referred to
as the technological frontier of the economy. The frontier is common knowledge.
Innovative activity in the economy is focused on expanding this frontier.
Firms turn labor input into consumption goods, and compete a` la Bertrand.
In each sector j, there will be a single active firm that can use an idea with
efficiency q(j) > z(j) and make positive profits by charging the marginal costs
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of the competitor producing with efficiency z(j), 1z(j)
15.
Researchers obtain ideas about how to produce goods more efficiently. Let
Rt denote the measure of researchers at t, and let
Rt = βtnLt, (9)
i.e., βt is the fraction of the active population that are researchers. Denote
the growth rate of researchers as gt. To each researcher, ideas arrive as a Poisson
process with parameter α16. Therefore, the stock of ideas (i.e., the level of
technology) evolves according to
T˙t = αRt, (10)
and
Tt = α
t∫
0
Rs ds+ T0, (11)
where T0 is the initial level of technology.
Research is undirected, and efficiencies of new ideas, q(j), are drawn from
the Pareto distribution, H(q) = 1− q−θ, which is the same for all sectors17.
Under these assumptions, Eaton and Kortum (2001) derive the technological
frontier and link it to production costs. As prices are set to marginal costs, they
are able to show that the price index is itself a function of production costs, and
can be expressed as a function of the stock of research,
Pt = γ T
−1/θ
t , (12)
where γ is Euler’s constant. It follows that:
15We assume that if consumers are faced with identical prices for goods produced with
different efficiency levels, they will always buy the good with the higher efficiency level.
16This parameter can be seen as the efficiency of research.
17The parameter θ > 1 governs the variation in efficiencies of production.
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P˙t
Pt
= −1
θ
T˙t
Tt
, (13)
i.e., the overall price index decreases at a rate that is proportional to the
rate of technological progress in the economy.
3.2. Profits and value of R&D
Profits from improvements in the technological frontier determine the value
of an innovation. Eaton and Kortum (2001) show that total profits of firms,
Πt, can be expressed as a function of total expenditure in the economy and
the distribution of the inventive step m of new ideas, as these determine the
markups over costs. They also show that this distribution, H(m), is Pareto and
independent of time.
Let yit|τ be an individual’s optimal expenditure at t. Let Yt =
t∫
0
∫
i
yit|τ di dτ
be total expenditure at time t. Given that the markups, m’s, are drawn from
H(m), total profits at t are
Πt = Yt
1∫
0
[1−m(j)−1] dj = Yt
∞∫
1
(1−m−1) dH(m) = Yt
1 + θ
. (14)
Total expenditure at t is equal to consumption, which is equal to total out-
put, Yt, which in turn is the sum of total profit and total wage income in the
economy at t. Total wage income depends on the measure of individuals who
choose to work in the production sector. Individuals only earn income the mo-
ment they are born, τ . The measure of agents that are born at time t is nLt.
Out of these, a fraction (1 − βt) will work in the production sector. Given the
wage and additional labor endowments, o, total income in the economy is
Yt = (1− βt + o)nLt + Yt1 + θ ⇒
Yt =
1 + θ
θ
(1− βt + o)nLt.
(15)
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The value of an innovation, Vt, is equal to the present discounted value of the
future streams of profits that it grants. Apart from profit flows, Πt = Yt1+θ , this
value has to take into account the discount rate (rt), the change in price level,
and the probability of the profit flows ending. Patent rights to an innovation
become void at any s > t if a better idea arrives, which occurs with probability
Tt/Ts. This implies that the value of an innovation is given by
Vt =
Pt
1 + θ
∞∫
t
e−r¯st(s−t)
Ys
Ps
Tt
Ts
ds =
Pt
θ
∞∫
t
e−r¯st(s−t)
(1− βs + o)nLs
Ps
Tt
Ts
ds. (16)
Finally, combining (15) and (12) yields average consumption per capita at
t, which is increasing in the stock of ideas:
xt =
Yt/Lt
Pt
=
1+θ
θ (1− βt + o)n
γT
−1/θ
t
. (17)
Both the value of an innovation, (16), and consumption per capita, (17), dif-
fer from their respective values in Eaton and Kortum (2001) through additional
labor endowments, o, and the fact that only a fraction n of the total population
is earning any income at time t.
4. Equilibrium
4.1. Labor market optimality
Denote by Wt the utility of working in the production sector and by EUt the
expected utility of research. Initial assets can take three distinct values, i) 1 + o
if agent i works in production, ii) Vτ +o if agent i is a successful researcher, and
iii) o if agent i is an unsuccessful researcher. Combining equations (8) and (7)
for consumption at time τ and using the appropriate level of initial assets, for
all τ ∈ t,
14
Wτ =

1
1− σ
[(
1 + o
Pτ
)1−σ
µστ − 1
ρ+ υ
]
if σ 6= 1 and σ ≥ 0,
1
ρ+ υ
[ln(1 + o)− ln(Pτ ) + ln(ρ+ υ)] + Iτ if σ = 1,
(18)
and
EUτ =

1
1− σ
{
α
Tτ
[(
Vτ+o
Pτ
)1−σ
µστ − 1ρ+υ
]
+
(
1− α
Tτ
)[(
o
Pτ
)1−σ
µστ − 1ρ+υ
]}
if σ 6= 1 and σ ≥ 0,
α
Tτ
[
ln(Vτ + o)− ln(Pτ ) + ln(ρ+ υ)
ρ+ υ
+ Iτ
]
+
+
(
1− α
Tτ
)[
ln(o)− ln(Pτ ) + ln(ρ+ υ)
ρ+ υ
+ Iτ
]
if σ = 1,
(19)
where Iτ ≡
∞∫
τ
(r¯tτ − ρ− P˙P tτ )(t− τ)e−(ρ+υ)(t−τ) dt.
Define Et = EUtWt as the expected utility of research relative to working in
the production sector at time t. This measure determines the agents’ choice
between R&D and work. In particular, the labor market allocation is optimal
for all agents if
Rt =

0 if Et < 1 and 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1,
0 if Et > 1 and σ > 1,
∈ [0, nLt] if Et = 1,
nLt if Et > 1 and 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1,
nLt if Et < 1 and σ > 1.
(20)
The optimal labor market allocation is determined by the path of research
stock, {Tt}, which in turn determines the evolution of the price level, the ex-
pected value of an innovation, and the probability to innovate. The path of
research stock is an equilibrium if it yields the path of research, {Rt}, necessary
15
to generate it.
4.2. Interest rate
In endogenous growth models of the type on which our model is based on,
the economy typically exhibits a balanced growth path along which both the
fraction of researchers in the economy, β, and the interest rate, r, are constant.
Our first result establishes that the constancy of the interest rate indeed hinges
on the fact that the fraction of researchers is constant over time.
Lemma 1. On any equilibrium path such that the average growth rate of re-
searchers converges to a constant, lim
t→∞ g¯st = g, the average interest rate between
t and s ≥ t converges to a constant,
lim
t→∞ r¯st =
g
θ
(2σ − 1) + σn+ ρ. (21)
If on the equilibrium path βt = β holds for all finite t ≥ tˆ ≥ 0, r¯st =
g
θ (2σ − 1) + σn+ ρ holds for all s ≥ t ≥ tˆ.
Proof. See Appendix Appendix A.
The convergence result in Lemma 1 relies on the fact that for any constant
growth rate of researchers, g, the fraction of researchers will converge to a
constant. In particular, βt will converge to zero if g < n− υ and may take any
value β in the limit if the growth rate of researchers converges to g = n−υ. For
finite t, a constant interest rate is again conditional on βt = β, which in finite
time can only occur if either gt = n− υ or Rt = 0 for all t.
Under risk neutral preferences, an equilibrium path exists on which gt = n−υ
and βt = β > 0 for all t. It is not obvious that such an equilibrium path also
exists with risk averse agents. However, Lemma 1 establishes that the interest
rate will converge to a constant for a large class of research growth rates. For
any level of risk aversion σ and limit growth rate of researchers g, there exists
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a private discount factor ρ such that the interest rate converges to a constant
in the long run that is large enough to ensure that the expected value of an
innovation is finite.
4.3. Growth rate of researchers
We are now in a position to derive the equilibrium path of the economy.
Definition 1. Given initial values of the stock of research and the labor force,
T0 and L0, as well as population growth rate n ≥ 0 and death rate υ ≥ 0, with
n ≥ υ, an equilibrium is a path of the stock of research, {Tt}, such that for
all t: (i) the stock of research evolves according to equation (10), (ii) the path
of research satisfies (20), (iii) the price level satisfies equation (12), (iv), the
expected value of an innovation satisfies equation (16), (v) the probability to
innovate is α/Tt, and (vi) consumption demand is equal to output.
As the interest of this paper is to identify the effect of risk aversion on
occupational choice decisions and hence research growth, we first derive the
equilibrium of our model for risk neutral agents, σ = 0.
Lemma 2. Let σ = 0. The economy exhibits a balanced growth path along which
the measure of researchers grows at rate g = n−υ and average consumption per
capita grows at rate gθ .
Proof. See Appendix Appendix B
The derivations of equilibrium are standard and straightforward if g = n−υ.
In particular, we know that the interest rate is constant over time and our model
trivially yields the same results with respect to research as Eaton and Kortum
(2001). Lemma 2 reiterates known results that neither the introduction of work-
specific labor endowments, nor the perpetual-youth aspect of the model affect
the steady-state properties of the model. Any differences in the equilibrium
research path in our model are therefore entirely due to risk aversion of agents.
We find that, compared to the case of risk neutral agents, the introduction
17
of risk aversion leads to non-trivial alterations in the equilibrium properties of
the economy. Indeed, the economy exhibits qualitatively different equilibria,
depending on the exact level of risk aversion.
Theorem 1. Assume that σ > 1 and denote T¯ = α 1
1−( 1+oo )
1−σ . The behavior
of research on an equilibrium path depends on the initial stock of research, T0:
1. If T0 ≥ T¯ , there exists a unique equilibrium path of research such that
Rt = 0 ∀ t.
2. If T0 < T¯ , Rt = 0 for every t is not an equilibrium; some research will be
undertaken at some t. Tt is then increasing, and T¯ is the maximum stock
of research that can be reached in the economy.
Proof. See Appendix Appendix C
Theorem 1 establishes that there exists a clear cut-off value of σ, i.e., σ = 1,
above which growth in the economy eventually stagnates. There exists an upper
level of technology above which the economy can never grow. The qualitative
result is particularly strong as it does not depend on the exact level of risk
aversion σ, nor on how much exogenous “security” agents have through their
labor endowments o. These parameters impact the level of T¯ , but not the
qualitative result of eventual stagnation.18 However, it is straightforward to
show that the level of T¯ is increasing in both α and o, and decreasing in σ.
This result is in stark contrast to the qualitative equilibrium behavior of the
economy if 0 < σ ≤ 1, as we now show.
Lemma 3. Assume 0 < σ ≤ 1. Along an equilibrium path of research, it cannot
be that lim
t→∞Tt = T . There does not exist a t0 such that for all t > t0, Rt = 0.
Proof. See Appendix Appendix C
Lemma 3 shows that for low enough values of risk aversion, some research
will be undertaken, and in particular, on an equilibrium path there does not
18As research success determines the entire consumption profile over an agents’ lifetime once
and for all, our results are also robust to the introduction of preferences of the Epstein-Zin
type. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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exist an upper bound on the stock of research. The proof, given in full in Ap-
pendix Appendix C, proceeds by contradiction. We show that there exists no
finite value of T to which Tt may converge, such that a path of research along
which the measure of researchers converges to zero will be an equilibrium. Un-
fortunately, while we are able to establish that low levels of risk aversion imply
that research does never cease altogether, it is not obvious how the equilibrium
research path looks for finite t. By Lemma 1, we know that a constant growth
rate of researchers will lead to a constant interest rate in finite time only if either
no research is undertaken at all, or if the growth rate of researchers is equal to
the population growth rate. The latter, however, can be shown to violate the
optimal labor market allocation19. Consequently, even if an equilibrium path of
research exists along which the measure of researchers grows at a constant rate
(possibly zero or negative), the interest rate on this path will not be constant,
and it is not obvious how the expected value of an innovation evolves on this
path. We are able instead to make additional statements on the asymptotic be-
havior of the economy. We begin by defining the concept of an asymptotically
balanced growth path.
Definition 2. Let a path of research {Rt} and average consumption per capita
{xt} be an equilibrium path. This path is an asymptotically balanced growth
path if lim
t→∞ gt = g and limt→∞
x˙t
xt
= x˙x .
As we know from Lemma 1 that the interest rate converges to a constant
whenever gt → g, we can state the properties of an asymptotically balanced
growth path.
Theorem 2. Assume that the economy is on an asymptotically balanced growth
path. On this path, the level of risk aversion affects the growth rate of researchers
as follows:
1. If 0 < σ < 1, in long run equilibrium it must be that the growth rate of
19The proof of this statement is trivial and therefore omitted. Setting g = n − υ, ββ , and
rt = r in the labor market optimality condition (20), it is straightforward to show that the
utility of research relative to work, Et, is decreasing over time.
19
researchers converges to g = (1 − σ)(n − υ) > 0. Both the measure of
researchers, Rt, and the stock of ideas, Tt, grow without bounds.
2. If σ = 1, in long run equilibrium it must be that the measure of researchers
is a strictly positive constant. The stock of ideas, Tt, grows without bounds,
but its growth rate converges to zero.
Proof. See Appendix Appendix D.
The long run equilibrium results of Theorem 2 show that along an asymptot-
ically balanced growth path, the measure of researchers will always be strictly
positive, and their growth rate converges to a constant. In line with our result
that growth ceases if σ > 1, Theorem 2 shows that also for σ ≤ 1, research ac-
tivity in equilibrium is, in the long run, decreasing in σ. For σ < 1, the growth
rate of researchers on the asymptotically balanced growth path is strictly de-
creasing in σ, while for σ = 1, the measure of researchers on this path converges
to a constant. Note that the growth rate of researchers is never affected by the
labor endowments o that are supplied in production. Growth rates are only ever
affected by the value of σ, and the growth rate of the population. However, we
show in Appendix Appendix D that for σ = 1, the measure of researchers to
which Rt converges in the long run is strictly increasing in o.
4.4. Consumption per capita
Average consumption per capita is given by equation (17), i.e.,
xt =
1 + θ
θ
(1− βt + o)n 1
γ
T
1/θ
t (22)
and its growth rate is
x˙t
xt
= − β˙t
1− βt +
1
θ
T˙t
Tt
. (23)
The following results on the growth rate and the level of xt follow immedi-
ately from our results on the equilibrium research path derived in the preceding
section.
20
Corollary 1. 1. Assume 0 < σ ≤ 1 and that the economy is on an asymp-
totically balanced growth path. On this path,
lim
t→∞xt =∞
lim
t→∞
x˙t
xt
=
(1− σ)(n− υ)
θ
.
2. If σ > 1, there exists a maximum level of average consumption per capita,
which depends on T¯ = α
1−( 1+oo )
1−σ :
xt =
1 + θ
θ
(1 + o)n
1
γ
T¯ 1/θ
Corollary 1 implies that the qualitative results on the effect of risk aversion on
the path of research translate one for one into impacts on average consumption
per capita. In particular, average consumption per capita grows without bounds
if σ ≤ 1, and is bounded if σ > 1. At the cut-off value of σ = 1, the stock of
research, and hence average consumption per capita grows without bounds.
However, as the measure of researchers converges to a constant in this case,
growth is linear, and the growth rate of xt converges to zero. Finally, as xt
depends on Tt, we observe level effects of increasing risk aversion even if σ > 1.
An increase in σ lowers T¯ and therefore lowers the maximum level of average
consumption per capita that can be achieved.
5. Conclusions
The vast majority of the work on endogenous growth shares the assumption
that agents are risk neutral. While this is a valid assumption under perfect cap-
ital markets, problems of either asymmetric information or moral hazard are
likely to prohibit perfect capital markets, a result that is theoretically plausible
and supported by empirical evidence. Lacking perfect capital markets, the nat-
ural aversion to risk characterizing individual innovators is expected to affect
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the conclusions obtained with traditional endogenous growth models with risk
neutral agents.
In our paper risk averse agents are introduced in a model of occupational
choice based on Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Kortum (1997). Under risk
neutrality in these models, consumption growth per capita ultimately depends
on the population growth rate and technological parameters. The equilibrium
balanced growth path encompasses a constant fraction of the population to
become researchers. Risk averse agents will clearly be more hesitant to engage
into innovation. We show that the equilibrium balanced growth path results of,
e.g., Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Kortum (1997), do not hold for risk averse
agents that cannot insure themselves. No matter the level of risk aversion, an
equilibrium path on which the measure of researchers grows at the same rate
as population does not exist. This result implies that there exists no steady
state in which consumption per capita would grow at a constant rate in finite
time. Given these results, we could expect that innovation would in the long run
completely disappear. Instead we show that even with risk averse agents and
complete lack of insurance against failure in innovation, there exists a cut-off
value of risk aversion below which a positive growth rate of researchers in the
long run is compatible with an asymptotically balanced growth path. Indeed,
if an equilibrium exists, it must be that on the equilibrium path the growth
rates of researchers and of the stock of ideas converge to a positive constant for
low levels of risk aversion. We find that the value of this growth rate depends
positively on population growth and negatively on the level of risk aversion.
For agents with risk aversion above the cut-off, the stock of ideas approaches
a constant, and no innovation takes place anymore once this level is reached.
However, the level of this stock of ideas itself depends negatively on the level
of risk aversion. As average consumption per capita in equilibrium depends on
the stock of ideas, this cut-off along an equilibrium path is also observed in the
growth rate (and level) of consumption per capita.
The results of the paper highlight the negative effect of risk aversion on
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growth but also show that some innovation is still possible even in the complete
absence of insurance markets. While on an equilibrium path the fraction of
researchers asymptotically converges to zero if insurance does not exist, both
the measure of researchers and the level of technology can grow without bounds
if risk aversion is low enough.
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Appendix A. Interest rate derivation
As there exists no savings technology in the economy, the resource constraint
requires that at each point in time, all produced output is also consumed. By
(15), output at t is given by
1
γ
T
1/θ
t
1 + θ
θ
(1− βt + o)nLt. (A.1)
From the consumers’ optimization problem, total consumption at time t is
Xt =
at∫∞
t
exp{[(1− 1/σ) (− 1θ g¯st − r¯st)− ρ/σ − υ](s− t)} ds (A.2)
where at it total wealth in the economy at time t, and we use the fact that
the price level is a function of the stock of research, and grows at rate − 1θgt.
This, in turn, is equal to the present discounted value of the future stream of
income, adjusted for the price level,
at =
∞∫
t
1
γ
T 1/θs e
−r¯st(s−t) 1 + θ
θ
(1− βs + o)nLs ds. (A.3)
Equating (A.2) and (A.3), we find that the following condition needs to hold
for the resource constraint to be satisfied:
(1− βt + o) =
∞∫
t
e[
1
θ g¯st+n−υ−r¯st](s−t)(1− βs + o) ds∫∞
t
exp{[(1− 1/σ) (− 1θ g¯st − r¯st)− ρ/σ − υ](s− t)} ds (A.4)
To prove Lemma 1, we first show that for any t ≥ tˆ with tˆ ≥ 0, a constant
average interest rate is the equilibrium interest rate if either gt = g = n − υ
or Rt = 0, i.e., gt = 0 and Rtˆ = 0. To this end, note that for g = n − υ, the
fraction of researchers is constant, βt = β, while if Rtˆ = 0 and g = 0, for any
t ≥ tˆ, βt = βtˆ = β = 0. In either case, equation (A.4) becomes
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∫ ∞
t
e[−(1−1/σ)(
g
θ+r¯st)−ρ/σ−υ](s−t) ds =
∞∫
t
e[
g
θ+n−υ−r¯st](s−t) ds (A.5)
which holds iff
−(1− 1/σ)
(g
θ
+ r¯st
)
− ρ/σ − υ = g
θ
+ n− υ − r¯st
r¯st =
g
θ
(2σ − 1) + σn+ ρ.
(A.6)
We proceed by showing that for any other value of g, the resource constraint
is not satisfied if r¯st = r. The argument is by contradiction. Suppose that
gt = g 6= (n− υ) and r¯st = r. Then, equation (A.4) becomes
(1− βt + o) =
∞∫
t
e[
g
θ+n−υ−r](s−t)(1− βs + o) ds∫∞
t
exp{[−(1− 1/σ) ( gθ + r)− ρ/σ − υ](s− t)} ds (A.7)
Only if either g = n− υ or Rt = 0 for all t do we observe that βt = β. For
all other values of g, the growth rate of βt is gβ = g − (n − υ). In this case,
simplifying (A.7) leads to
(1− βt + o) 1
(1− 1/σ) ( g
θ
+ r
)
+ ρ/σ + υ
= (1 + o)
1
− g
θ
− (n− υ) + r − βt
1
−g 1+θ
θ
+ r
(1 + o)
g
θ
(1/σ − 2)− n+ 1
σ
(r − ρ)
[(1− 1/σ) ( g
θ
+ r
)
+ ρ/σ + υ][r − g
θ
− (n− υ)] = βt
g
θ
(1/σ − 2− θ) + 1
σ
r − ρ
σ
− υ
[(1− 1/σ) ( g
θ
+ r
)
+ ρ/σ + υ][r − g 1+θ
θ
]
(A.8)
As the right-hand side of (A.8) depends on time through βt, and the left-hand
side does not, this condition can only hold if the numerators of both the left- and the
right-hand side are zero. The numerator of the left-hand side of (A.8) is zero iff
r =
g
θ
(2σ − 1) + ρ+ σn, (A.9)
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while the numerator of the right-hand side is zero iff
r = ρ+ συ +
g
θ
(2σ − 1 + θσ). (A.10)
Combining (A.9) and (A.10), we find that they are equal only if g = n− υ, which
contradicts our original assumption. I.e., there exists no other constant value g other
than n− υ (or zero research) for which the interest rate is constant for finite t.
To prove the convergence result of the Lemma, note that if lim
t→∞
gt = g, then
lim
t→∞
βt = β ∈ (0, 1), where β = 1 if g > n− υ and β = 0 if g < n− υ. In this case, we
can work with the limit of equation (A.4), which is
lim
t→∞
(1− βt + o) =
lim
t→∞
∞∫
t
e[
1
θ
g¯st+n−υ−r¯st](s−t)(1− βs + o) ds
lim
t→∞
∞∫
t
exp{[(1− 1/σ) (− 1
θ
g¯st − r¯st
)− ρ/σ − υ](s− t)} ds
(1− β + o) =
(1− β + o)
∞∫
t
e
[ 1
θ
lim
t→∞ g¯st+n−υ− limt→∞ r¯st](s−t) ds
∞∫
t
exp{[(1− 1/σ)
(
− 1
θ
lim
t→∞
g¯st − lim
t→∞
r¯st
)
− ρ/σ − υ](s− t)} ds
(A.11)
and
∞∫
t
exp{[(1−1/σ)
(
−g
θ
− lim
t→∞
r¯st
)
−ρ/σ−υ](s− t)} ds =
∞∫
t
e
[ 1
θ
g+n−υ− lim
t→∞ r¯st](s−t) ds
(A.12)
which is identical to the condition in (A.5) except that it depends on the limit of
r¯st rather than r¯st itself. Consequently, equation (A.12) is satisfied iff
lim
t→∞
r¯st =
g
θ
(2σ − 1) + σn+ ρ. (A.13)
QED
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Appendix B. Equilibrium with risk neutrality
If agents are risk neutral, consumers will be indifferent to the allocation of con-
sumption over time if the interest rate is r = ρ+ P˙t
Pt
. In this case, it is trivial that all
output will be consumed at each t. The (expected) utilities of work and research are,
respectively,
Wt =
1 + o
Pt
− 1
ρ+ υ
(B.1)
EUt =
α
Tt
Vt
Pt
+
o
Pt
− 1
ρ+ ν
(B.2)
and a labor allocation in which both workers and researchers are active is optimal
if, Et = 1, i.e.,
1 =
α
Tt
Vt (B.3)
It is straightforward to show that g = n − υ satisfies this equation. The value of
an innovation, Vt, is,
Vt =
(1− β + o)nLt
θ
∞∫
t
e[
1
θ
(n−υ)−r](s−t) ds
=
(1− β + o)n
θr − (n− υ)Lt
=
(1− β + o)n
θρ− 2(n− υ)Lt
(B.4)
and Tt = T0e
(n−υ)t, i.e., labor market optimality is satisfied if
1 =
α
T0
(1− β + o)n
θρ− 2(n− υ)L0. (B.5)
Finally, the growth rate of average consumption per capita, from equation (17), is
g
θ
. The economy follows a balanced growth path with g = n− υ.
Appendix C. Existence of (active) research equilibrium
Proof of Theorem 1:
27
For the proof of part 1 of Theorem 1, note that if σ > 1, a research path of Rt = 0
for all t is an optimal labor allocation if and only if for all t
α
Tt
[
(Vt + o)
1−σ − o1−σ]+ o1−σ > (1 + o)1−σ
Tt > α
(Vt + o)
1−σ − o1−σ
(1 + o)1−σ − o1−σ
(C.1)
where the reversal of the sign is due to the fact that (1 + o)1−σ − o1−σ < 0 if σ > 1.
For this condition to be met for all t, it must be that it holds for the maximal value
that the RHS can take. As with Rt = 0, the value of an innovation is
Vt =
(1 + o)nLt
θ[r − (n− υ)] , (C.2)
the RHS of (C.1) is strictly increasing in t, and therefore reaches its maximum value
as t→∞, in which case Rt = 0 for all t is an optimal labour market allocation if
Tt = T0 ≥ α 1
1− ( 1+o
o
)1−σ = T¯ . (C.3)
T¯ is the level of the stock of research such that agents are indifferent between
research and work only in the limit as t→∞. For all finite t, if Tt ≥ T¯ , agents strictly
prefer to work over engaging in R&D. If the initial stock of research is at least T¯ and
agents have “high” levels of risk aversion, the probability to innovate is so small that
no agent is ever willing to take that risk, and all agents always choose to work in the
production sector.
These derivations also show that for any Tt < T¯ , the equilibrium labor market
condition for zero research, (C.1), will be violated at some t. In particular, if we
assume Rt = 0 for all t and
Tt = α
1
1− ( 1+o
o
)1−σ −  (C.4)
with  > 0, there exists a finite value of t, tˆ, at which the expected utility of research
is identical to the utility of work, which shows that for any t > tˆ, Rt = 0 is no labor
market equilibrium:
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α
1
1− ( 1+o
o
)1−σ −  = α1−
[
(1+o)nLtˆ
oθ(r−(n−υ)) + 1
]1−σ
1− ( 1+o
o
)1−σ
1−
[
1−
(
1 + o
o
)1−σ]

α
= 1−
[
(1 + o)nLtˆ
oθ(r − (n− υ)) + 1
]1−σ
(1 + o)nLtˆ =

[

α
(
1−
(
1 + o
o
)1−σ)] 11−σ
− 1
 oθ(r − (n− υ))
tˆ =
1
n− υ ln


[

α
(
1−
(
1 + o
o
)1−σ)] 11−σ
− 1
 oθ(r − (n− υ))(1 + o)n

(C.5)
This result proves that as long as Tt < T¯ , some research will occur at some point
in time, and combined with our earlier result on the strict preference of work over
research whenever Tt > T¯ , we know that T¯ is the highest level of the stock of research
that may be reached if σ > 1. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Lemma 3:
The proof of the Lemma is straightforward by contradiction. For lim
t→∞
Tt = T
to hold, it must be that lim
t→∞
Rt = 0. From Lemma 1, we know that if Rt → 0,
the fraction of researchers and the average interest rate converge to constants. From
equations (18) and (19), zero research constitutes an optimal labor market allocation
in the long run if
lim
t→∞
α
Tt
[
(Vt + o)
1−σ + o1−σ
]
< (1 + o)1−σ if σ < 1, (C.6)
lim
t→∞
α
Tt
[ln(Vt + o) + ln(o)] < ln(1 + o)− ln(o) if σ = 1. (C.7)
We know that with zero research in the limit, lim
t→∞
Tt = T , and that the value of
an innovation in the limit is
Vt =
(1 + o)nLt
θ[r − (n− υ)] ∀t ≥ tˆ, (C.8)
which grows without bounds. This implies that (C.6) and (C.7) will be violated
in the long run, and we have reached a contradiction.
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Appendix D. Growth rate of researchers
We prove Theorem 2 by showing that no other path of research is compatible with
equilibrium in the long run. It is easiest to consider the cases 0 < σ < 1 and σ = 1
separately:
Case 1: 0 < σ < 1
Labor market allocation in the limit is optimal if
Rt =

nLt if lim
t→∞
α(Vt+o)
1−σ
Tt
− lim
t→∞
αo1−σ
Tt
> (1 + o)1−σ − o1−σ
∈ [0, nLt] if lim
t→∞
α(Vt+o)
1−σ
Tt
− lim
t→∞
αo1−σ
Tt
= (1 + o)1−σ − o1−σ
0 if lim
t→∞
α(Vt+o)
1−σ
Tt
− lim
t→∞
αo1−σ
Tt
< (1 + o)1−σ − o1−σ
(D.1)
For any gt such that lim
t→∞
gt = g, we know that:
lim
t→∞
T˙t
Tt
= g (D.2)
lim
t→∞
r¯st =
g
θ
(2σ − 1) + σn+ ρ (D.3)
Making use of these convergence results in equation (16), the expected value of an
innovation in the limit is
lim
t→∞
Vt =
(1 + o)nLt
θ[r − (n− υ) + g(1− 1
θ
)]
− Rt
θr − g , (D.4)
i.e., lim
t→∞
Vt =∞ if g < n− υ.
We already know that zero research at any t or as a limit will violate labor market
optimality. Now, we ascertain that a research path along which Rt = R0 or Rt → C,
where C is any positive constant, is not compatible with an equilibrium path in the
long run either. In this case, lim
t→∞
Vt =∞ and lim
t→∞
Tt =∞. This implies that
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lim
t→∞
α o
1−σ
Tt
= 0 (D.5)
lim
t→∞
α (Vt+o)
1−σ
Tt
=
∞
∞ . (D.6)
By L’Hopital’s rule,
lim
t→∞
α
(Vt + o)
1−σ
Tt
= lim
t→∞
α
(1−σ) V˙t
Vt(
V
σ−1
σ
t +oV
− 1
σ
t
)σ
T˙t
(D.7)
where either T˙t = αR0, if Rt = R0, or lim
t→∞
T˙t → αC, if Rt → C. In either case,
the limit of the denominator of (D.7) is a constant, and if we define B = {R0, C},
lim
t→∞
α
(Vt + o)
1−σ
Tt
=
1
B
lim
t→∞
(1− σ) V˙t
Vt(
V
σ−1
σ
t + oV
− 1
σ
t
)σ (D.8)
The denominator in (D.8) converges to zero. To determine the long run behavior
of V˙t
Vt
, first note that
Vt =
n
θ
T
θ−1
θ
t
∞∫
t
e
−
s∫
t
rx dx
(1− βs + o)LsT
1−θ
θ
s ds (D.9)
Define the integral in (D.9) as Jt ≡
∞∫
t
e
−
s∫
t
rx dx
(1 − βs + o)LsT
1−θ
θ
s ds. Then the
growth rate of Vt can be expressed as
V˙t
Vt
=
θ − 1
θ
T˙t
Tt
+
J˙t
Jt
(D.10)
with
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J˙t
Jt
= rt − (1− βt + o)LtT
1−θ
θ
t
∞∫
t
e
−
s∫
t
rx dx
(1− βs + o)LsT
1−θ
θ
s ds
= rt − (1− βt + o)∞∫
t
(1− βs + o)e[(n−υ)+ 1−θθ g¯st−r¯s−t](s−t) ds
.
(D.11)
This implies that
lim
t→∞
J˙t
Jt
= r −
lim
t→∞
(1− βt + o)
∞∫
t
[
(1 + o)e[(n−υ)+
1−θ
θ
g−r](s−t) − lim
t→∞
βte
[ g
θ
−r](s−t)
]
ds
= r −
lim
t→∞
(1− βt + o)
(1+o)
r−(n−υ)− 1−θ
θ
g
− limt→∞ βt
r− g
θ
= r −
(
r − (n− υ)− 1− θ
θ
g
)
= n− υ + 1− θ
θ
g,
(D.12)
since lim
t→∞
βt = 0, and that the growth rate of the value of an innovation, equation
(D.10), converges to
lim
t→∞
V˙t
Vt
=
θ − 1
θ
g + (n− υ) + 1− θ
θ
g = n− υ. (D.13)
Plugging this result into equation (D.8), we find that if the measure of researchers
either is a constant, or converges to a constant, the left-hand side of equation (D.1)
goes to infinity, under which condition the entire population should engage in R&D,
contradicting the assumption that the measure of researchers is constant.
As the measure of researchers on an equilibrium path cannot go to zero and cannot
be nor converge to a constant, the measure must increase over time. Consider any
gt → g. Note, this includes exponentially growing measures of researchers as well as
measures of researchers that grow at rates lower than exponentially. In this case,
T˙t = αRt, (D.14)
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and Rt → ∞. The long run behavior of the left-hand side of (D.1) is again
determined by the limit behavior of (Vt+o)
1−σ
Tt
, but now also the derivatives of the
numerator and the denominator go to infinity in the limit. We make use of the following
relationship:
α
Tt
[
(Vt + o)
1−σ − o1−σ] = (1 + o)1−σ − o1−σ ⇒
ln(α)− ln(Tt) + ln[(Vt + o)1−σ − o1−σ] = ln[(1 + o)1−σ − o1−σ] ⇒
− T˙t
Tt
+
(1− σ)(Vt + o)−σV˙t
(Vt + o)1−σ − o1−σ = 0 ⇒
− T˙t
Tt
+ (1− σ)
V˙t
Vt
1 + oV −1t − o1−σ(V
σ−1
σ
t + oV
− 1
σ
t )
σ
= 0 ⇒
lim
t→∞
− T˙t
Tt
+ (1− σ) lim
t→∞
V˙t
Vt
1 + oV −1t − o1−σ(V
σ−1
σ
t + oV
− 1
σ
t )
σ
= 0
We know that T˙t
Tt
→ g, that Vt →∞ and that V˙tVt → n−υ. Consequently, the only
value of g that does not contradict an equilibrium path on which both researchers and
workers are active in the long run is g = (1 − σ)(n − υ). Note that this also shows
that Rt cannot grow at a rate below exponential on an equilibrium path, as this would
imply gt → g = 0.
Case 2: σ = 1
If σ = 1, the condition for an optimal labor market allocation becomes
Rt =

nLt if lim
t→∞
α ln(Vt+o)
Tt
− lim
t→∞
α ln(o)
Tt
> ln(1 + o)− ln(o)
∈ [0, nLt] if lim
t→∞
α ln(Vt+o)
Tt
− lim
t→∞
α ln(o)
Tt
= ln(1 + o)− ln(o)
0 if lim
t→∞
α ln(Vt+o)
Tt
− lim
t→∞
α ln(o)
Tt
< ln(1 + o)− ln(o)
(D.15)
For any path of researchers such that Tt →∞, an optimal labor market allocation
in the long run requires that
lim
t→∞
α ln(Vt + o)
Tt
= ln(1 + o)− ln(o) (D.16)
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And the left-hand side of (D.16) can be evaluated, similar to the case where σ < 1,
by applying L’Hopital’s rule:
lim
t→∞
α ln(Vt + o)
Tt
= α lim
t→∞
V˙t
Vt
1+oV−1t
T˙t
(D.17)
We know that lim
t→∞
V˙t
Vt
1+oV−1t
= n − υ, and that lim
t→∞
T˙t = αRt. This implies that
(D.16) cannot hold if gt → g > 0. It can hold, however, if either Rt = R0 or
Rt → C > 0. In this case, if we again let B ≡ {R0, C}, we find that
lim
t→∞
α ln(Vt + o)
Tt
=
n− υ
B
(D.18)
which is equal to ln(1+o)−ln(o) if B = n−υ
ln(1+o)−ln(o) . Which implies that only con-
stant and positive measures of researchers are compatible with optimal labor market
allocation in the long run if σ = 1.
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